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Abstract 
 The main topic of this study is how the framing of liberation struggles as terrorism affects 
public opinion for military action. The goal of this thesis is to investigate how the “counter-
terrorist” discourse of the Russian President Vladimir Putin after the focusing event of 9/11 affected 
the Russian public opinion towards the Second Chechen War. Furthermore, I argue that the 9/11 
attacks facilitated the (re)framing of the conflict from an internal issue of separatism to an external 
issue of global terrorism and a greater public support for the war. The theoretical framework 
utilized is the framing theory and the mechanism-based approach of Alimi et al. (2015) in order to 
examine how counter-terrorist discourse created polarization and affected the public opinion. Ten 
most salient quotes of presidential speeches for each period of pre 9/11 and after 9/11 attacks of the 
timeframe from September 1999 until December 2003 were selected based on the relevance and the 
focus of transcripts and were analyzed through Van Dijk’s (2004) framework. These two frames 
were compared with the public opinion polls from the Levada Center. The results revealed that the 
framing of the conflict was predominantly “counter-terrorist” the whole examined timeframe and 
even before the 9/11 attacks whereas, interestingly, there were instances when Putin recognized the 
interconnection between separatism and terrorism after 9/11. However, the results did not support 
the expectations for greater public support towards war in the period after 9/11 and that the event of 
9/11 facilitated the acceptance of the framing in the domestic arena. 
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1. Introduction 
 The “war on terror” is one of the most important conflicts since the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Few hours after September 11, 2001 attacks, President Bush declared that US was launching a 
“global war against terrorism” and this “new” threat required a new response by pronouncing prior 
deterrence and containment methods insufficient. Thus, preemption strategies followed and 
international military coalitions and campaigns under the vague banner of the “war on terror” 
launched wars such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. This counter-terrorist campaign of such a large-scale 
political and military project required a significant degree of social consensus which is not possible 
without the deployment of a specific and dominant discourse in order to justify and normalize a 
“global war” (Jackson, 2005). Many scholars examined how this controversial concept of the term 
“terrorism” was since used by the Bush administration and the mass media discourse in order to 
justify and mobilize the global military, political, legal and conceptual struggle against countries 
associated with Islamic terrorism organizations. Specifically, a lot of research examined how the 
“war on terror”  has impacted the fight against terrorism and how the discursive framing of the wars  
took place in order to be accepted by their domestic audiences, abusing civil rights and liberties 
(Jackson, 2005).  
 However,  the “war on terror” discourse affected not only the fight against terrorism but 
separatist movements have been affected as well. 
 The term “terrorism” has been frequently changing its meaning throughout history. 
According to Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism is where politics and violence intersect in the hope of 
delivering power. All terrorism involves the quest for power: power to dominate and coerce, to 
intimidate and control, and ultimately to effect fundamental political change” (Hoffman, 2006, p.
174). In other words, terrorism refers to the use or the threat of violence for sociopolitical ends as a 
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means of asymmetric warfare against a large number of noncombatants. Ethno-nationalist separatist 
movements refer to liberation and self-determination struggles and such movements aim to gain 
territorial independence, autonomy and can sometimes involve violence and  resort to terrorist acts 
in pursuit of separatists goals. The level of violence used by these groups is “to determine an 
effective level of violence that is at once “tolerable” for the local populace, tacitly acceptable to 
international opinion, and sufficiently modulated not to provoke massive governmental crackdown 
and reaction” (Hoffman, 2006, p.233). According to many scholars , even when the means are 
easily definable as “terrorist” it is tricky to talk of a “terrorist organization” (Donatella della Porta, 
2013, p.28) 
 This vague distinction between the two concepts is evident in contemporary world of “war 
on terror”.  For example, the Uyghur ethnonationalist separatist movement in China was associated 
with Al-Qaeda cooperatives. In Turkey, Kurdish separatists are referred to as terrorist groups by the 
Turkish government and it rejects any negotiation with them. In Russia, the Second Chechen War 
started as an “operation to restore constitutional order” and resulted after 9/11 as a “counter-terrorist 
operation” (Pokalova, 2011). Specifically, after 9/11, Putin’s administration opportunistically played 
up the connections of Chechen rebels with Al-Qaeda jihadists and we have a rapprochement of 
Russia-US and a cooperation with Bush administration on “war on terror”. The radicalization of 
Chechen rebels started in the meantime of the two wars (Hughes, 2013) but, according to many 
scholars, there is no concrete evidence that Chechen rebels were “jihadists”, “Al-Qaeda Shock 
Brigades”, “Mujahedeen” as they were “classified” by Russian elites and media editorials (Bhatia, 
2005, Williams, 2004, Russell, 2002, Souleimanov, 2015).  
Such trends, I argue, indicate that governments exploit this interconnection between sepa-
ratism and terrorism and opportunistically play up the latter one to strategically frame their policies  
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and gain public support for violent acts. The reason of this discursive framing is because govern-
ments attempt to resist the accommodation of ethno-nationalist separatist grievances or change the 
territorial status quo. Framing an entire separatist movement as a terrorist threat avoids any negotia-
tion with the separatists and facilitates a distinction between “us” and “them”. This thesis explores 
the use of framing by governments in order to disguise their true challenges to gain more wide-
spread support for military force. I use September 11 as a focusing event that allowed governments 
to shift their framing of ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Thus, I compared the pre-9/11 framing 
of ethno-nationalist separatist conflict with the framing that emerged following the 9/11 attacks 
(Polakova, 2011). 
 While a lot of research has focused on both separatism and terrorism, not much scholarship 
studied the crossover between the two and examined the effects of the “war on terror” discourse on 
ethno-national separatist conflicts and how this shift affected the domestic public opinion. This the-
sis intends to amend this situation and uncover the effects of framing discourse on the evolutionary 
course of a conflict characterized in forms of “terrorism” ,while “terrorism” was a result of the war 
and not its cause.  
 This project is a qualitative study based on the single case study of the Second Chechen War 
for the timeframe of September 1999 until December 2003. The research question is formulated as 
follows: “How the framing in terms of “war on terror” of the Second Chechen war by the Russian 
government affected the Russian public opinion?” Firstly, light is shed on the existing literature and  
on its relevance for this study. Second, the theoretical framework is discussed and the case 
selection. Third, the methodology and the analytical framework is laid out. Fourth, the data analysis 
and the conclusions are discussed. 
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2. Literature Review 
  
 War is undoubtedly a social practice that begs the question “why?”. Indeed as a deadly 
activity endangering  human lives , in order to mobilize masses and generate support, war must be 
assigned a certain degree of legitimacy before it is undertaken. And this legitimation of violence 
takes serious rhetorical effort that is most often undertaken by the political leadership. One key to 
success for political leaders is their “soft power”, argued by Nye (2004),  to persuade others without 
using force to do things they otherwise would not do. 
 The conception of identity discourses in war is aimed to be instrumental and the discourse 
formation, in discourse theory, is seen as a social process. Subsequently, for various reasons, power-
ful actors may attempt to “convince their audiences that a certain incompatibility of goals is threat-
ening them, and try to turn this into a dominant discourse”. In essence, according to Jarvis, these 
representations do not merely describe or “mirror” objects, but they position and “actively con-
struct” objects in relation to the “self” (and demonizing the “other”, the “enemy”) and by that 
means, perceiving certain categorizations as real, they act upon them. “Discourse is action” and this 
is the power of it (Demmers, 2012, p.125). Specifically, scholar studies show that dominant classifi-
cations such as “terrorist” are selectively employed by powerful actors, through “politics of nam-
ing” in order to justify violent actions and gain public support (Bhatia, 2005, Suthaharan Nadarajah 
& Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, 2005, Donatella della Porta, 2013). 
 The crucial role of discourse as the instrument of politics has been recognized by cognitive 
linguists (Lakoff, 1999, 2004) and discourse analysis experts (Fairclough, 1989, Wodak, 2001, 
2002). Many scholars studied the role of political discourse in the creation of social reality and how 
it affects the public opinion. Discourse explains and justifies social activity, and involves providing  
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‘good reasons, grounds, or acceptable motivations for past or present action’ (Van Dijk, 1998, p.
255) .  
 According to Ball (1988) and the social construction theory, political actors play a key role 
in the social construction of reality. Zaller (1992) argues that political elites frame and control the 
way events are presented. Goffman (1974, 1983) refers to a process of “fabrication” and Schneider 
and Ingram (1997) refer to “framing dynamics”, which is the ability of the political elites to frame 
issues and it can be used as a tool to affect the process of social construction of the reality (Pokalo-
va, 2011).  
 Studies of political communication such as that of Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 
(2014) stressed out the notion of “strategic narratives” and the “framing” in political discourse in 
shaping international affairs and public opinion. 
 Drawing from theories of social movements, according to Donatella della Porta (2013), “ 
frame analysis focuses on the attribution of the meaning that lies behind the evolution of social 
movements by looking at the recognition of certain facts as social problems, of the strategies to ad-
dress them, and of the motivations for action” (p. 37).  
 Finally, it is not hard to see how political rhetoric “frames” the social construction of the re-
ality by giving certain “meanings” to political issues or events. Thus, discourse framing and public 
opinion is interconnected. This thesis is based on the argument that reality is socially constructed 
and as a result, our perceptions can be changed in terms of how the information is presented to us. 
Consequently, framing theory constitutes the theoretical framework for this project focusing on the 
question how the framing of the Second Chechen war by the Russian government, in terms of  “war 
on terror” and not “separatism” , affected the Russian public opinion.  
 In this project I treat the 9/11 attacks as a focusing event that facilitated the shift in Russian 
government’s framing. Specifically, I argue that the 9/11 attacks were crucial for Russia’s framing  
Master Thesis   8
challenges  and by portraying the conflict in terms of “war on terror” gained domestic acceptance. 
Thus, the focusing event served not only to frame the issue of “terrorism” itself but allowed the 
“terrorist” framing to be involved in other phenomena such as ethno-national separatism. While a 
lot of research investigated how focusing events created new frames (Jackson, 2005) little research 
has been done on how focusing events such as the 9/11 attacks not only created new frames and ap-
plied the new frames into policies but also, allowed political elites to re-frame the existing issues 
(such as separatism) in their better interests (Polakova, 2011). This thesis fills this knowledge gap. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
  
 In this study, I apply the theory of framing in order to answer the research question “How 
the framing in terms of “war on terror” of the Second Chechen war by the Russian government af-
fected the Russian public opinion?”. I argue that the theory of framing is suitable in order to exam-
ine the relationship between the political discourse and its discursive construction of social reality 
and the response of public opinion. Opinion polls are both an indicator of approval of government 
policies as well as a target that politicians try to influence by employing certain discourses. Fur-
thermore, except from the classic theory of framing, I use the notion of upwards political opportu-
nity spirals in order to explain how the “terrorist” framing was facilitated by the 9/11 attacks in the 
Chechen case and how both mechanisms played a role in the categorization “Us/Them” (Alimi et 
al., 2015). Particularly, I examine how this Us / Them distinction in terms of the 
“terrorist” (re)framing affected the Russian public opinion. The “counter-terrorist” discourse, as 
many scholars argue, is based on this distinction (Jackson, 2005, Van Dijk, 2006). 
  
Utilizing the framing theory I hypothesize that:  
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• The more “counter-terrorist” was the political discourse regarding to the Second Chechen War 
after 9/11 attacks , the greater was the Russian public acceptance of the war. 
  
 I examined how the Second Chechen war was framed by the Russian political 
discourse ,using the focusing event of the 9/11 attacks, prior to 9/11 attacks and after the attacks and 
which was the public opinion response before and after the attacks and then, I compared the differ-
ent frames for the same issue and the public opinion responses. 
 Framing is one of the primary tools that political elites use in order to influence public opin-
ion (Druckman and Nelson 2003). According to political communication scholars and political sci-
entists there are two ways of using the term “frame” (Druckman, 2001c; Scheufele, 1999). Firstly, a 
“frame in communication” refers to the words, images and the style of presentation that a speaker 
such as a politician or a journalist uses when delivering information about an issue or an event to an 
audience (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, 1989). Secondly, a “frame in thought” or an “individual 
frame” is the cognitive understanding of a certain issue by an individual (D. Chong & J. N. Druck-
man, 2007). In this project I will investigate “frames in communication” from the President of Rus-
sia. 
 Political elites use frames in order to promote a desired level of policy support from its au-
dience (Gamson & Modigandi ,1987, Callaghan & Schnell, 2005) and by emphasizing certain ele-
ments of their policies while omitting others , elites use framing to “manipulate popular preferences 
to serve their own interests” (Chong & Druckman 2007, p.120). According to Edelman (1993, p.
231), political elites “ win public support for [their] actions only by creating and spreading beliefs 
about those who are deserving and those who are threats” (Pokalova, 2011). 
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 According to Chong and Druckman (2007) the framing theory refers to that a particular is-
sue can be viewed from multiple perspectives and framing is a process “by which people develop a 
particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong & Druck-
man 2007, p.104). Framing is a mechanism that serves for the social construction of the reality and 
is a tool for generating particular conceptualizations (Pokalova, 2011). Thus, frames are patterns of 
interpretation that allow individuals “to locate, perceive, identify and label” what happens in the 
world (Snow et al. ,1986, p.464). 
 There are two perspectives of defining frames. The sociological perspective views framing 
as a process that generates the construction of social reality and the frame is referred as “schemata 
of interpretation” allowing individuals to process the relayed information (Gooffman, 1974). 
Frames act as plots that construct together pieces of information to introduce a coherent narrative 
(Entman, 1993). Furthermore, according to Entman (1993), frames highlight some aspects of reality 
and make them more salient in a communicating text , providing a problem definition, diagnosing 
causes, making moral evaluation and oftentimes solution recommendations while omitting other 
features which might lead audiences to have different responses. Jackson (2005) argues, for in-
stance, that the “war on terror” illustrates an example of a not objective representation of reality and 
a discursive construction which affected our understanding of terrorism and influenced our policy 
preferences for counter-terrorism strategies (Polakova, 2011). The psychological approach argues 
that political elites use framing not only to present issues from a particular perspective but also to 
foster certain public responses (Tversky & Kahneman ,1981). Different presentations of the same 
issue provoke different responses from the audience and can lead to a shift in public opinion , 
known as “framing effect” (Chong & Druckman , 2007). In this project I adopt both approaches of 
defining frames (Pokalova, 2011). 
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 In this project I utilize the theoretical framework of Alimi et al. (2015) in order to explain 
the relationship between the state (the Russian government) and the social movement (Chechen 
separatists) and how the “terrorist” framing was facilitated by the 9/11 attacks domestically. Con-
trary to McAdam et al. (2001), they introduce an open-ended, actor-based relational approach of a 
mechanism-based social context which they term as “arenas of interaction”. They use mechanisms 
(and sub-mechanisms) as key tools and useful units of comparison to explain processes of radical-
ization . In other words,  how a non-violent movement at some point becomes violent. According to 
Tilly (2003), mechanisms are “similar events that produce essentially the same immediate effects 
across a wide range of circumstances” (Tilly, 2003, p.20).  
 Also, they emphasize the “portability” of mechanisms from one context to another (Falleti 
& Lynch, 2009), that they are not fixed dimensions of variance and can correspond to different 
ways of operationalization. They identify only mechanisms (and their interactions) that play a cen-
tral role in “contentious episodes “ and they do not exhaust all forces at play. Their approach is dif-
ferent from the case comparison and covariance approaches because in order to unfold the process 
they try, firstly, to explain the process (“how” and “when” processes of radicalization take place). 
Especially, they argue that “processes of radicalization involve relational, cognitive and environ-
mental mechanisms, and that relational mechanisms mediate the salience of the other two types of 
mechanisms in variable ways” (Alimi et al., p.38). 
 However, in this project my main focus is not on how the Chechen movement was led to 
stepped-up radicalization but, how the “framing” in terms of “terrorism” was facilitated by 9/11 at-
tacks and how, through various processes, the binary ‘Us/Them’ became more salient. I use this 
theoretical model in order to unfold the process of Russian state’s framing of the Second Chechen 
conflict. 
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 Specifically, I utilize the notion of “upward spirals of political opportunities” relational 
mechanism which is defined as “newly developing political constraints or threats on the move-
ments’s space of action or ability to promote its goals”  (Alimi et al., 2015, p.39) and “changes in 
the movement’s political environment that alter the constraints, possibilities, and threats the move-
ment faces, thereby enabling or inhibiting its collective action and/or goal attainment” (p.42) . This 
actor- specific mechanism explains the relations in the arena between the social movement and the 
political environment . I argue that  the 9/11 attacks constituted an “upwardly” constellation of 
changes and weakened the strategic positioning of the ethnonationalist separatist Chechen move-
ment vis-a-vis the Russian state. The sub-mechanism “framing” defined as “adopting and broad-
casting  a shared definition of an issue or performance” (Alimi et al., 2015, p.28) took place with 
the 9/11 attacks. After the 9/11, the “war on terror” cooperation increased the salience of the cogni-
tive sub-mechanism “threat attribution” defined as “the construction of a shared definition concern-
ing the likely negative consequences of possible actions… undertaken by a political 
actor” (McAdam et al., 2001 p.95). Thus, the 9/11 facilitated the “framing” of the Chechen conflict 
in terms of “new” terrorism. The new position and the counter-terrorist policies undertaken by the 
Russian state weakened the political leverage of the separatist Chechen movement. This mechanism 
“triggered” and worked closely with the cognitive sub-mechanism of “attribution of opportunity” 
defined as “the construction of a shared definition concerning the likely positive consequences of 
possible actions by a political actor” (McAdam et al., 2001, p.95). Subsequently, these two sub-
mechanisms increased the salience of “boundary activation”. This cognitive sub-mechanism defined 
as “increase in the salience of the ‘us-them’ distinction separating two political actors” (Tilly and 
Tarrow, 2007, p.215) undermined more the separatist’s movement goals and the “war on terror” dis-
course divided socially the Russian state and the Chechen movement (Alimi et al. , 2015). 
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 I argue that these mechanisms were at play on September 9/11 and the “war on terror” facili-
tated the “framing” of the Chechen conflict as “counter-terrorist operation” which resulted in 
“boundary activation” and the distinction between Us/ Them , where “them” they referred to “ter-
rorists” Chechens and not “separatists”.  In this project, utilizing the framing theory and the theoret-
ical framework of Alimi et al. (2015) I investigate how this “counter-terrorist” framing of the con-
flict affected the Russian public opinion and hypothesize that the more “counter-terrorist”  (which 
allows a great distinction between Us/Them and “demonizing” the enemy) was the political dis-
course regarding to the Second Chechen War after 9/11 attacks , the greater was the Russian public 
acceptance of the war. 
  What the framing theory explains, as I elaborated above, is the relation between the political 
discourse and the public response. What the theory predicts is a “framing effect”. According to 
Druckman (2001),  a framing effect is “said to occur when, in the course of describing an issue or 
event, a speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to 
focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions” (p. 1042). In order for a framing 
effect to occur, a given conceptualization (e.g. a political speech) needs to be stored in the individ-
ual’s memory, be available and accessible . Accessibility increases through regular exposure to a 
communication frame (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Finally, Nelson et al. (1998) argue that the 
framing effect works through a “psychological process” in which individuals are conscious and not 
passive and they deliberately think about the “relative importance of different considerations sug-
gested by a frame” and the frames work “by altering belief importance” (Druckman, 2001). 
4.Case study: Chechnya 
 According to I. Khrestin and J. Elliott (2007), nothing shapes Russia’s foreign policy deci-
sion making about Middle East and terrorism than the region of Chechnya. While US security is  
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threatened by the Islamist terrorism, the Chechen conflict threatens both Russian national security 
and territorial integrity. Under Yeltsin’s presidency, the presence of Russian military in North Cau-
casus in 1994 claimed about one hundred thousand lives. The first Chechen War was tough for the 
Russians and resulted in a widespread demoralization of federal forces and the almost unanimous 
opposition of the Russian public opinion to the conflict pressured Boris Yeltsin’s government to de-
clare a ceasefire with the Chechen Republic in 1996 and sign a peace treaty a year later. According 
to the casualties figure for Russian military deaths, the number is even estimated as high as 14,000. 
The defeat for Russians was a military humiliation. 
  The radicalization of Chechen rebels started in the meantime of the two wars (Hughes, 
2013). After 1996 cease-fire, Chechnya was referred as “Somalia of the Caucasus” and anarchy 
dominated in the region (Khrestin & Elliott, 2007). In the fall of 1999, Vladimir Putin became Rus-
sia’s new prime minister and ordered the Russian military to reassert order in Chechnya (Khrestin & 
Elliott, 2007, Freedman, 2010). His brutal second Chechen war in 1999 (Dannreuther, 2012) helped 
him to thwart the near anarchy situation in Russia from Yeltsin era, consolidate his power and even-
tually, become president (Khrestin & Elliott, 2007, Freedman, 2010). 
  After the terrorist attacks in the US on 9/11, Putin was the first foreign leader who called G. 
Bush (Khrestin & Elliot, 2007). The 9/11 attacks led to a complete change of U.S. policy, putting 
less pressure towards the Russian war against Chechnya (Hughes, 2013). Following 9/11 attacks 
and the declaration of the global “war on terror” against the transnational Islamist terrorism by the 
Bush administration, Putin skillfully seized the opportunity to cooperate with the West against the 
transnational terrorism as well as the eradication of Taliban in Afghanistan (Trenin, 2013) and stop 
the negative international criticism about the rough Russian stance in Chechnya and human rights 
violations (Allison, 2013; Dannreuther, 2012) by overemphasizing the transnational terrorist dimen-
sion of the Chechnya war (Notte, 2016 & Trenin, 2013). The terrorist threat emanating from  
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Chechnya was described in Russian discourse as global in nature and links with Al-Qaeda were op-
portunistically stressed out by the Russian leadership (Notte, 2016). 
 Current research on Chechnya has produced many contradictory narratives of the conflict by 
the Russian government, western governments, Chechen separatists, journalists and scholars as 
well. In Russia, the Second Chechen War started as an “operation to restore constitutional order” 
and resulted after 9/11 as a “counter-terrorist operation”. Particularly, in the Second Chechen War 
and the Putin’s era, we have a shift of Russian narrative from “bandits”, “mafia” and “madmen” 
Chechens in Yeltsin’s era to “terrorists”.  
 I selected this case study as illustrative of the crossover between terrorism and ethno-nation-
al separatism where the Russian government, especially after 9/11 attacks, attempted to “frame” the 
conflict as mainly in terms of “international terrorism”. 
 Therefore, it is really interesting to examine the way discourses affect the transformation of 
liberation struggles to terrorism, how that categorization of “terrorists” may be not real (but oppor-
tunistically played up or constructed by powerful actors) and consequently, whether this characteri-
zation of the conflict as a form of terrorism affected the opinion of the Russian citizens. The materi-
al reasons why Russia conducted the war against the Chechen Republic and cooperated with the 
Bush administration is beyond of the scope of the study. 
 Furthermore, most of the research in framing and the “war on terror” is focused on western 
governments. However, this counter-terrorist discourse strategy is not dominant only in the western  
world but it is rather universal and discourses are only one of the forms of communication in which 
it is expressed (Renwick , 2007 & Cohen, 2016) and that is a reason why I selected this case study. 
Thus, this study provides an empirical contribution to the academic world as long as there is multi-
ple studies regarding to the western world and only few studies regard to the other half of the world 
whereas the phenomenon is rather global. 
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5. Methodology and Data 
  
 In this project I examine the political discourse regarding to the Second Chechen War em-
ployed by Putin administration in the timeframe starting from September 1999 and the Moscow 
apartment bombings until 2003 when three Chechen groups were included as terrorist organizations 
in the U.S. and UN terrorist lists. The Moscow apartment bombings, which was a series of apart-
ment explosions that hit the Russian cities of of Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk in September 
1999 killing thousand of people, spread a wave of fear across the country. I selected the start of this 
study timeframe because the bombings, which characterized as a “terrorist” attack by the Russian 
government whereas the issue is disputed and controversial by many scholars, together with the 
Dagestan War, led the Russian government into the Second Chechen War. In 2003, the enlistment of 
three Chechen groups as terrorists by the US Department and the United Nations indicates in some 
way the acceptance of the Russian narrative by the West. In 2003, Russia started to distance itself 
from the “war on terror” cooperation due to the American war against Iraq.  
 In order to analyze the framing of the Russian government in terms of “war on terror” I uti-
lize a Critical Discourse Analysis approach as a method and particularly that of Van Dijk’s (2006). 
 Van Dijk (1998, 2001) advocated the notion of “manipulation” triangulating a social, cogni-
tive and discursive approach. The development of an Us/Them binary that involves the semantic 
macro strategy of the self positive representation versus the other negative representation and is at 
the best interest of manipulator against the best interest of dominated groups. This notion, I argue, is 
related to the “boundary activation” I elaborated on the theoretical framework. Thus, Van Dijk’s 
method is suitable in order to investigate how this binary ‘Us/Them’ (triggered with ‘boundary acti-
vation’) in Russian political discourse in terms of ‘war on terror’ affected the Russian public opin-
ion. 
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 Manipulation is a social phenomenon -because it involves social interaction and abuse of 
power between actors and groups, a cognitive phenomenon -because it occurs through the manipu-
lation of the minds of human groups, and a discursive-semiotic phenomenon -because manipulation 
is exercised through text, talk and visual images. Manipulation examines the formation or the 
change of socially shared representations such as attitudes and ideologies about important social 
issues and events (Van Dijk, 2006).  
Analytical Framework: 
 Van Dijk (2004) sees the political discourse as a social process and advocates the notion of 
“manipulation” triangulating a social, cognitive and discursive approach. According to Van Dijk 
(2004) there are two main strategies in the form of an “ideological square”: emphasize our good 
things, emphasize their bad things, de-emphasize our bad things, de-emphasize their bad things (p.
734).  Apart from the two general strategies of representation, van Dijk (2004) introduces 25 other 
ideological strategies.The selected key terms of the framework are defined in the Appendix (p.22). 
 All these discursive features/ strategies of manipulation were examined in closer detail to 
see how they function in text and talk and examine how they achieve their contextual effects. All of  
the data are textual. I firstly critically analyzed the texts by employing the Van Dijk’s framework 
and identifying the features/ strategies of discursive manipulation. The semantic and rhetorical fig-
ures identified in the speaker’s text are presented in boldface and interpreted using the definitions of 
strategies from the Van Dijk’s study (2006). I compared the texts prior to 9/11 and the period after 
the attacks, on the basis of the number of the occurrence of identified strategies in the texts. 
 Van Dijk’s theoretical approach to manipulation strategies, unlike other frameworks in the 
field of CDA, is a comprehensive one. His design is a combination of argumentation, political  
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strategies, rhetorical tools and semantic strategies in order to uncover the distortion of realities in 
the process of discourse projection. In addition, Van Dijk (2006) takes into consideration politics, 
sociology, history and context and proposes a thorough, all-purpose framework (Rashidi &Souzan-
dehfar, 2010). Considering all these above advantages of the theoretical framework, this study uti-
lize van Dijk’s framework in order to analyze our materials. However, there are some limitations of 
this methodology that have to be stressed out. Morgan (2010) argues that the array of options avail-
able through the multiple traditions can render issues of methodology problematic, as each tradition 
has its own epistemological position, concepts, procedures, analytical frameworks in particular un-
derstanding of CDA and the meaning can never be fixed (Mogashoa, 2014). 
Data : 
  The selected 4 transcripts from presidential interviews and 4 statements from press confer-
ences regarding to the Chechen conflict for each period from September 1999 until December 2003 
(10 transcripts for the period before 9/11 and 10 transcripts for the period after 9/11), based on the 
relevance and the focus of transcripts and the relevant year . I used the materials from the Official 
Kremlin presidential website http://kremlin.ru/. In order to find the texts regarding to the Chechen 
conflict I used the keywords “Chechnya”, “Chechen”, “North Caucasus” for the search and 
arranged the dates for the specific timeframe.  
  For the acceptance attitudes of the Russian public opinion regarding to the Chechen conflict 
I  utilized public opinion polls from professional polling services in Russia, the Levada Center. The  
Levada Center is a Russian and independent, non-governmental polling and sociological research 
organization. It was rated by experts as very reliable and one of the largest Russian research com-
panies and regularly conduct its own and commissioned polling research. 
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 In order to examine how the political discourse affected the public opinion towards the con-
flict I compared the results of the most salient quotes I identified in the analyzed transcripts be-
tween the two periods with the data from public opinion polls. 
  Using polling data has the accompanying limitations such as distribution and the question 
format. 
6. Data Analysis
a. Discourse Analysis
Period before 9/11
1. Transcript of 
Interview with the ORT 
TV Channel on 
February 7th, 2000
…  the  people  who  took  control  of 
Chechen  territory  are  not  content 
with  the  independence  of  Chechnya 
and have gone further.
…. If  these extremist  forces  manage 
to  gain a  foothold in  the  Caucasus, 
and  not  only  gain  a  foothold  in 
Chechnya  but  several  other 
territories,  then  this  “contagion” 
could  move up the  Volga River  and 
spill  into  other  republics.  And  then 
we  will  either  face  the 
“balkanization” of Russia…
The President presupposes that the goal of the 
Chechen militants is not independence. Then, he 
utilizes  lexicalization  expressing  terrorism  in 
Chechnya as “contagion” and that it will result in 
“balkanization”  of  Russia  to  illustrate  the 
importance of the problem.
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2. Transcript of 
Interview to “BBC 
Breakfast with Frost”  
on March 5th, 2000
…the  Chechen  people  have  fallen 
victim  to  international  extremism… 
So  what  we  got  was  like  a  mini-
Afghanistan… And from that moment 
on it became crystal clear to us that 
unless we deliver a blow at the very 
lair of terrorism, at the bases situated 
in  the  Chechen  Republic,  we  would 
never be able to rid ourselves of this 
scourge, this gangrene…
President Putin by presenting Chechen people as 
“victims” of international extremism make use of 
the  victimization  strategy.  He  illustrates  the 
Chechen conflict as the example of Afghanistan 
utilizing  the  lexicalization  and  the  metaphor 
“mini- Afghanistan”. Furthermore, he attempts to 
create  a  consensus  in  order  to  fight  against 
terrorists  and  utilizes  lexicalizations  and 
metaphors such as “scourge” and “gangrene”. 
3. Transcript of a Joint 
News Conference of 
President Vladimir 
Putin and British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair on 
March 11th, 2000
… What is going on in the Caucasus 
is  not  only,  and  not  so  much,  a 
Chechen  problem…  Terrorist  forces 
promptly  filled  the  vacuum  that 
Russia  tolerated  in  Chechnya.  They 
do  not  limit  themselves  to  one 
republic  but  are  out  to  cross  the 
Chechen  borders  and  attack  Russia 
along all  its  borders.  Russia cannot 
afford  to  tolerate  this  dangerous 
situation…
The  President  internationalize  the  Chechen 
conflict  utilizing  generalization.  Then,  he 
presents  Russia  positively  and  terrorists 
negatively, creating polarization  when he says 
“Russia cannot afford to tolerate this dangerous 
situation”.
4. Statement 
Concerning Violation of 
Human Rights in the 
Course of the 
Counterterrorist 
Operation in the North 
Caucasus on April 13th, 
2000
…  The  militants  desecrated  basic 
principles of Islam under the cover of 
Sharia  to  wage  war  on  the  entire 
population of Chechnya…
President  Putin  presents  the  Chechen militants 
negatively.
5. News Conference 
Following Russian-
British Talks on April 
17th, 2000
… Our aim is to free Chechnya from 
international  terrorists  and 
extremists,  who  are  threatening 
Russia and other European countries 
in  an  equal  measure… In  this  case 
Russia is fighting against this global 
evil  singlehanded,  and  this  is  not 
right,  because  extremism  is  a 
common  enemy  of  the  civilized 
world…
Vladimir  Putin  employs   positive  self- 
representation to advocate that Russia alone is 
fighting against  terrorism and  for the terrorists 
negative other- representation using the topos 
“global evil”.  Furthermore, the topos “civilized 
world”  is  utilized  in  order  to  emphasize  the 
distinction between Us/ Them.
6. Statement for the 
Press and Answer to a 
Question on the Results 
of the Russia-EU 
Summit on May 29th, 
2000
…We call on all of you to pool your 
efforts  in  the  fight  against 
international terrorism…
In  this  quote  the  President  Putin  attempts  to 
create  a  consensus  in  order  to  fight  against 
terrorism.
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In the period before the 9/11 attacks, President Putin utilized -as is illustrated in the table 
above- a family of metaphors such as  “contagion”, “scourge”, “gangrene” in order to describe the 
Chechen militants and the more common representation “bandits” as his predecessor President 
7. Interview with 
German TV Channels 
ARD and ZDF on June 
9th, 2000
…We  are  not  fighting  against  the 
Chechen  people  there.  It  has  never 
been our aim to suppress or enslave 
Chechnya…When  the  bandits  came 
to these villages – by the way,  it  is 
also  a  Muslim   republic  –  they 
murdered  people,  destroyed  houses, 
stole property, they took things out of 
homes by the truckload…
The  President  describes  the  Chechen  militants 
who  are  referred  as  “bandits”  and  utilizes  the 
strategy  of  other  negative  representation  in 
order to show the binary Us/Them. Moreover, he 
provides  examples/ illustrations so as to make 
more vivid their actions.
8. Statement for the 
Press and News 
Conference on the 
Results of the Russian-
Spanish Negotiations  
on June 14th, 2000
…we believe that we are confronting 
not  just  separatists  and nationalists, 
we are confronting terrorists, because 
nationalists  and  separatists  do  not 
come  to  a  neighboring  republic,  as 
happened  with  Dagestan,  under  the 
slogan  of  Chechen  independence. 
They  came  and  attacked  Dagestan 
under a different slogan…
In  this  quote  President  Putin  presupposes  that 
Chechen  separatists  are  mainly  terrorists  and 
their aim is not Chechen independence.
9. Interview With the 
Italian Newspaper 
“Corriere della Sera” 
on July 16th, 2001
…But the Chechen people themselves 
fell victim to Muslim fundamentalism. 
That  is  why  what  we  are  doing  in 
Chechnya enjoys fairly broad support 
in  Russian  society  because, 
confronted  with  the  aggression  of 
Islamic  fundamentalism  from  the 
territory  of  Chechnya,  we  had  to 
protect our territorial integrity…
Putin  employs  in  this  quote  the  strategy  of 
victimization  :  Chechens  are  presented  as 
victims  of  Muslim  fundamentalism,  whereas 
Russia  is  positively  presented  fighting  against 
fundamentalists.
10.  Excerpts from the 
Transcript of a Press 
Conference for Russian 
and Foreign Journalists 
on July 18th, 2001
…Was  it  prompted  by  the  need  to 
fight  for  the  independence  of 
Chechnya?  We  all  understand  that 
this  is  delirious  rubbish,  it  has 
nothing in common with the interests 
of  the  Chechen  people…They  are 
trying to supplant the interests of the 
Chechen  people  with  their  own 
fundamentalist aspirations and goals. 
And when we fight against them, they 
claim  that  we  are  fighting  against 
Chechnya  and  its  population,  and 
some people take it up consciously or 
because  they  don’t  understand  the 
essence of the events…
The President claims that Chechen militants do 
not fight for independence but are terrorists. He 
employs  lexicalization  “delirious  rubbish”  to 
give emphasis on that and utilize the strategy of 
victimization to counter the terrorist’s narrative 
of aggressive Russia.
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Yeltsin.  The  Russian  President  illustrated  the  Chechen  conflict  characterizing  it  as  “mini- 
Afghanistan”  and  referred  to  the  threat  of  “balkanization”  of  Russia.  According  to  J.  Headley 
(2005),  Russia  was  deeply  concerned  with  the  “arc  of  instability”  which  included  three 
geographical  areas:  Central  Asia,  the  Balkans  and  the  North  Caucasus.  Thus,  the  President 
attempted to illustrate the ideological links between Chechnya and other extremist regions. This 
metaphorical language about Chechen “terrorists” facilitated the framing of the Chechen conflict in 
the period before the 9/11 attacks in terms of “terrorism international”. Thus, drawing from the 
political discourse, Vladimir Putin used a phraseology and lexical mechanisms in order to present 
the situation in Chechnya as not an internal issue of ethnonational separatism but of  global jihad. 
In parallel, the rhetorical mechanisms indicate that President Putin utilized one of the oldest 
in history and powerful  “topos” such as the civilized/ barbarian division. The speeches of President 
Putin  were  full  of  phraseology  such  as  “the  global  evil”,  “enemy of  the  civilized  world”  and 
“bandits”.  These  epithets  and  categorizations  in  the  Russian  political  discourse  aimed  to 
dehumanize their opponents. This moralistic language by the Russian government  illustrated the 
Chechen rebels as uncivilized people and Chechnya as a territory where lawlessness and disorder 
were dominant. Therefore, this other negative representation and the “barbarian” rhetoric facilitated 
the  de-legitimation  of  their  opponents.  On  the  contrary,  Russia  was  discursively  represented 
positively  as  a  country  fighting  against  fundamentalism  and  a  legitimate  force  struggling  to 
maintain law and order in the region. The identified victimization mechanism indicates  that the 
Chechen conflict  is  framed and justified  in  counter-terrorist  and  self-  defense  terms where  the 
victims are the Chechen people who fell victims of international terrorists abroad and have links 
with the Chechen movement’s perpetrators  and the Russian people who are under this threat. As a 
result, the Russian President denied the legitimacy of their internal “uncivilized” opponents and 
argued for defensive action creating a consensus in order to justify the military intervention against 
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Chechnya  to  “eliminate”  the  “terrorist”  movement  which  was  covered  under  the  slogan  of 
separatism.
To  sum  up,  the  main  frame  in  political  communication  of  this  period  is  the 
“internationalization” of the Chechen conflict and the framing of the Chechen rebels in terms of 
“international terrorists” rather than “separatists”. The independence of Chechnya, according to the 
Russian President, was merely “delirious rubbish” and a slogan used by Chechen terrorists who 
were affiliates with terrorists abroad and specifically in Central Asia and the Balkans. 
Period after 9/11-1
1. Interview with the German 
Magazine Focus on  September 
19th, 2001
…  Eventually  it  created  the  grave 
situation  we  have  been  trying  to 
bring under control in Chechnya for 
a year and a half  now…Today they 
speak  unofficially,  but  openly  to  all 
intents  and  purposes,  about 
recruiting  volunteers  to  be  sent  to 
Afghanistan. This is well known, the 
mass  media  have  reported  it.  And 
there  are  many  such  centers  in 
Western  Europe.  But  we  should  not 
allow this situation. You know, when 
an ostrich is in danger, it  buries its 
head  in  the  sand  believing  that  the 
rest  of  its  body is  invisible too.  But 
that  is  not  so…First,  because 
fundamentalists,  under  the  cover  of 
the  fight  for  the  independence  of 
Chechnya, started implementing their 
plans that had nothing to do with the 
independence  of  Chechnya:  they 
launched  an  attack  on  the 
neighboring Republic of Dagestan…
In this quote, the Chechen conflict is 
described with the metaphor “grave” 
in  order  to  illustrate  the  situation. 
With the phrase “this is well known, 
the media have reported it” there is 
still vagueness of facts and  a sense 
of  evidentiality  is  supported by the 
authority  of  the  mass  media. 
Moreover,  he  wants  to  create  a 
consensus  for  fighting  against 
terrorist  and  employs  the  powerful 
metaphor of the ostrich to illustrate 
plausibly his argument that Chechen 
militants  are  fundamentalists  and 
their goal is not the independence of 
Chechnya.
2. Russian President’s Statement 
on September 24th, 2001
… Now that the  civilized world  has 
defined its position on fighting terror, 
everyone  should  define  his  or  her 
position as well. This chance should 
also be offered to those who have not 
yet laid down arms in Chechnya…
Putin  here  employs  the  strategy  of 
polarization and categorization. He 
utilizes  the  topos  “civilized  world” 
where  “Us”  are  identified  ,  while 
“Them”  are  terrorists.  Thus,  he 
implies  that  Chechen  militants  are 
terrorists  and  they  should  stop 
fighting against Russia.
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3. Statement and Answers to 
Questions Following the Russia-
EU Summit on  October 3rd, 
2001
… First, it is evident to us that there is a 
link  between  those  who  are  trying  to 
further their ends in the North Caucasus 
and  especially  in  Chechnya  by  force  of 
arms  and  international  terrorists.  The 
explosions of residential houses, markets 
and  other  places  where  people 
congregate, and explosions in New York 
and Washington are indisputable proof of 
the link. They reveal the same hand. We 
have  proof  that  the  substance  used  for 
these  terrorist  attacks  has  been 
produced..
This  whole  quote  links  Chechen 
militants with international terrorists 
and using evidentiality with phrases 
such as “indisputable proof”, “it has 
proven  by  the  investigation”  , 
vagueness and the metaphor “same 
hand” implies and presupposes  the 
interconnection  of  Chechens  with 
terrorism and rejects any connection 
with the independence narrative.
4. Answers to Questions at a Joint 
Press Conference with the CIS 
Heads of State on  November 
30th, 2001
…  And  of  course  that  enclave  has 
relay  towers  which  the  militants  in 
Chechnya  use  to  communicate  with 
their  sponsors in the Gulf  countries 
and in Afghanistan. All this is a very 
real,  and  not  an  imagined  problem 
for us…
The  President  implies  and 
presupposes  the  links  of  Chechen 
militants with international terrorists.
5. Joint Press Conference with the 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
on  December 21st, 2001
… the situation is not all that simple 
and we are not going to pretend that 
we  are  dealing  only  with 
manifestations  of  terrorism  in 
Chechnya,  although  many  of  the 
problems  there  are  created  by 
international terrorists…But some of 
the  people  who have not  laid  down 
their arms can hardly be referred to 
as terrorists because they are driven 
above  all  by  the  ideas  of 
separatism…everybody knows that it 
is a problem that confronts not only 
Russia,  but  many other parts  of  the 
world, including Europe…
In  this  quote  no  strategy  of  Van 
Dijk’s  framework  was  identified. 
There  is  a  shift  on  President’s 
discourse: Chechens militants are not 
categorized  as  terrorists  such  as  in 
quote 2 but separatists. Here there is 
no rejection of the Chechen conflict 
in  terms  of  independence  and 
separatism.
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6. Interview with the Polish 
Newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and 
the Polish TVP Channel on
January 15th, 2002
…  Terrorism,  fundamentalism  and 
other  manifestations  of  extremism 
thrive on territories that are
not  controlled  by  internationally 
recognized  governments.  We  should 
on no account allow that to
happen. But that does not mean that 
we should not take into account the 
legitimate demands and
interests of any people or any group 
of the population. That fully applies 
to the people of
Chechnya…
Similarly,  no strategy of  Van Dijk’s 
framework was identified. There is a 
shift on President’s discourse: in this 
text the interconnection of terrorism 
and separatism is clearly described.
7. Interview with the Chinese 
News Agency Xinhua and 
Chinese Central Television 
(CCTV) on November 27th, 2002
…And  these  processes  essentially 
stem from the fact that international 
terrorism,  under  the  cover  of  false 
slogans  of  fighting  for  the 
independence  of  Chechnya,  is 
actually  pursuing  goals  that  have 
nothing to do with the interests of the 
Chechen people. In effect, it is part of 
a global terrorist network, and their 
aims  are  different:  to  separate  the 
North  Caucasus  from  Russia  and 
then continue on…
President Putin employs the strategy 
of  victimization  to  prove  that 
Chechens  fell  victims  of  terrorists 
and there he presupposes  that there 
is  no  connection  with  claims  of 
independence.
8. Interview to France-3 
Television on February 9th, 2003
… This does not mean, however, that 
there are no problems in Chechnya at 
all,  connected  with  the  issues  of 
separatism…
The President acknowledges that the 
Chechen  conflict  is  connected  with 
the issue of separatism and does not 
reject it here. There are no strategies 
identified.
9. Transcript of a Meeting with 
the French Regional Press and 
TV Channels  on February 12th , 
2003
…They  effectively  took  Chechnya 
back  into  the  Middle  Ages,  started 
imposing an alien brand of Islam on 
the  Chechen  people  and  launched 
genocide  of  the  non-Chechen 
population.  We  estimate  that  about 
30,000–35,000  people  had  been 
killed…It is not much different from 
the  idea  of  the  world  communist 
revolution or the Nazi idea of world 
dominance, only under the slogans of 
Islam…
Putin  utilizes  the  metaphor  of 
“Middle  Ages”  to  describe  the 
situation  in  Chechnya  in  order  to 
describe  the  terrorist  actions  and 
present  them  negatively.   He 
employs  a  number  game 
“30.000-35.000”  to  display 
objectivity.  Furthermore,  he  uses 
hyperbole  strategy  utilizing 
metaphors  of  “communist 
revolution”  and  “Nazi”  to  illustrate 
how  dangerous  are  these 
fundamentalist ideas.
Master Thesis   26
In the period after 9/11, President Putin utilized plenty of metaphors in order to describe the 
situation in Chechnya.  Specifically, he characterized it as a “grave situation” which took the region 
“back into the Middle Ages” and where fundamentalism is not much different from “the communist 
revolution” or the “Nazi” ideology and terrorists as “ostriches”. These powerful metaphors indicate 
the magnitude of the existential threat the President attempted to convey to the public in order to 
frame  the  Chechen  conflict.  Furthermore,  Putin  used  the  example  of  Yugoslavia  in  order  to 
strengthen his securitization argument that Chechen terrorists can cause the collapse of the Russian 
state.
Similarly to the period before the 9/11 attacks,  the presidential speeches referred again to 
the Us/Them division.  The President  created a polarization utilizing the topos of the “civilized 
world” dividing “us” as “civilized” Russian people and “Them” as terrorists which resembles to 
common political  counter-terrorist  speeches of other leaders (Jackson, 2005).  This division was 
aimed  to  present  the  Russian  state  positively  and  Chechen  rebels  as  perpetrators  who  had 
connections with international terrorists.
The main frame in political communication of this period -same as in the period before the 
9/11 attacks- is the “internationalization” of the Chechen conflict and the framing of the Chechen 
rebels in terms of “international terrorists” rather than “separatists”. Particularly, most of the quotes 
10. Excerpts from the President’s 
Live Television and Radio 
Dialogue with the Nation on  
December 18th, 2003
… Their aim is not independence for 
Chechnya, but for all the areas where 
there  are  a  lot  of  Muslims.  We,  of 
course,  must  fight  this  if  we  don’t 
want  to  see  the  collapse  of  our 
country.  If  this  were  to  happen,  it 
would be worse  than Yugoslavia.  It 
would mean a Yugoslav scenario for 
Russia in its worst form and with far 
more  victims.  Armed  with  this 
knowledge  we  have  to  fight  this 
problem,  fight  together  with  the 
whole  international  community, 
because  the  threat  does  not  come 
from  within,  it  comes  from  beyond 
our borders…
Putin  here  rejects  any  connection 
with the independence of Chechnya. 
Especially,  he  uses  the  example  of 
Yugoslavia to make more persuasive 
his  illustration  of  Chechnya  and 
attempts  to  create  a  consensus 
among  the  international  community 
to fight against terrorism.
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clearly  reject any interconnection of the Chechen conflict with separatism and highlight the global 
threat of terrorism.
However, there is a contradiction in the framing of the Chechen War in quotes 5, 6 and 8. 
From the beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin attempted to discursively “internationalize” 
the  conflict  in  terms  of  a  counter-terrorist  campaign.  These  three  quotes  indicate  a  different 
narrative which constitute a paradox. While the rhetorical representation of the conflict was framed 
predominantly as an external affair - Chechnya as one of the battlefields of international terrorism 
and the  global  jihad and the  Chechen rebels  as  not  members  of  the  ethnonationalist  separatist 
movement but members of the international terrorist movement and the manifestation of the global 
evil- in these quotes the issue was presented as an internal one as well, where Russia is fighting to 
preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Thus, the President here clearly admitted that there 
is an interconnection between separatism and terrorism. Interestingly, the President acknowledges 
this interconnection soon after the 9/11 attacks in the Joint Press Conference with the British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair on  December 21st, 2001 and a year after to Polish journalists and on February 
9th, 2003 to French television. 
On  balance,  the  central  narrative  is  the  same  as  in  the  period  before  the  9/11  attacks: 
President  Putin rejected the connection of the conflict  with the independence of Chechnya and 
declared that the international terrorist movement, which had links with the Chechen movement, 
was threatening the stability, integrity and security of the Russian state and thus, he attempted to 
create a consensus to combat this “international issue” and justify the Chechen war. Nevertheless, 
there were instances where the framing of the Chechen conflict was discursively paradoxical. Even 
though the presidential discourse was predominantly “counter- terrorist” , which created a great Us/
Them binary as in the previous period,  Putin in some instances acknowledged that the two issues of 
separatism and terrorism are intertwined.
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b. Public opinion polls Analysis
“What do you think, should Russia continue military actions against Chechnya -or start peaceful 
negotiations?
In December 1999, the 72% of Russians considered that it is better to continue the war against 
Chechnya, whereas 20% believed that negotiations should start. In both December 2000 and 2001, 
the figures decreased  to 45% of Russians who deemed that the war should continue whereas, the 
sentiment in favor of negotiations in 2000 and 2001 increased up to nearly 42% from 20% in last 
year. Overall, the sentiment in  December 1999 was in favor of the war and in December of 2000 
and 2001 the half of the Russian public opinion was in favor of peaceful negotiations.
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“What do you think, should Russia continue military actions against Chechnya -or start peaceful 
negotiations?”
  
 Obviously, in February and April 2000 the Russian public sentiment was in favor of the 
continuation of  the  Second Chechen War.  However,  in  October  2000 a  shift  in  public  opinion 
occurred and the public was divided between the continuation of military actions and the need for 
peaceful negotiations with the Chechen Republic. After the 9/11 attacks, in October 2001, the half 
of  Russian  population  believed  that  their  government  has  to  start  peaceful  negotiations  with 
Chechnya.  In   October  2002,  the   Russian  public  opinion  was  equally  divided  between  the 
continuation  of  the  military  operation  against  Chechnya  (46%)  and  the  need  for  peaceful 
negotiations (45%). However, in 2003 the figures towards negotiations reached the peak of 68% in 
November 2003.
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Conclusion 
 A close examination of the transcripts through the van Dijk’s (2004) framework reveals that 
the Russian government framed the Chechen conflict in terms of “counter-terrorism” - and not 
“separatism”- throughout the whole examined timeframe. Specifically, in the period before 9/11 the 
number of the occurrence of the identified strategies is 27 and for the period after 9/11 is 25 which 
indicates that the “counter-terrorist” framing was dominant in both periods. However, drawing from 
the transcripts 5, 6 and 8 after the 9/11 there is an obvious shift in presidential discourse and fram-
ing of the conflict: the interconnection of terrorism and separatism was recognized. Thus, before 
9/11 the framing was predominantly “counter-terrorist” and after 9/11 it continued to be, however, 
there were some instances when Vladimir Putin recognized that terrorism and separatism are inter-
connected. 
  The analysis of the opinion polls showed that the public opinion between 1999 and 2000 
was in favor of the war against Chechnya (up to 70%) whereas, the figures indicate that from Octo-
ber 2000 the general trend started to favor peaceful negotiations. In 2001 the opinion was divided 
and after the 9/11 attacks until 2003 the Russian public opinion showed a great support towards 
peaceful negotiations. The data indicate that the “counter-terrorist” framing before 9/11 affected the 
public opinion which favored military actions, however, the “counter-terrorist” framing of the con-
flict after 9/11 attacks was not persuasive to the public which gradually favored rather peaceful ne-
gotiations and reached the peak of 68% (November 2003). 
 Therefore,  the hypothesis of this study was not justified. The expected outcome of the study 
would be that after 9/11 the public opinion would be affected by the counterterrorist framing and 
favor the military continuation. On the contrary, the results showed that in 2001 the opinion was  
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rather divided and gradually favored negotiations. Furthermore, an unexpected result was that there 
were instances when the political discourse after 9/11 acknowledged the interconnection of terror-
ism and separatism. Drawing back to the theory of framing, the empirical data prove the “framing 
effect” which the theory predicts in the period before 9/11 due to high public support towards mili-
tary actions. However, the Russian public did not favor the war after the 9/11 attacks as the framing 
theory would predict.  
 I suggest that this theory is highly interpretive and is concerned with interpreting the mean-
ings actors assign to communication and assumes that there are multiple meanings than one singular 
objective truth. Also, it is difficult empirically to achieve accurate predictions while the large body 
of data is qualitative. Therefore, this high subjectivity of discursive interpretation indicates the gen-
eral predictive ability of the theory to be low. 
 The theoretical framework of Alimi et al. (2015) clearly explains how the “counter-terrorist” 
framing of the conflict was created. However, the empirical data showed that the “counter-terrorist” 
-and not the “separatist” framing- discourse was salient before 9/11. Specifically, although the first 
examined period precedes the 9/11 attacks, the Russian government framed the Chechen conflict in 
terms of a “counter-terrorist operation” and attributed the threat of international terrorism to the 
Chechen rebels and the Chechen separatist movement by providing a new shared definition of them 
in terms of “international terrorists”. At the same time, President Putin constructed a positive repre-
sentation of Russia and attempted to create a consensus in order to fight against global terrorism. 
Thus, this rhetorical polarization created a strong binary of  Us/ Them and the mechanism of 
boundary activation occurred even before the focusing event of the 9/11 attacks. Thus, no (re)fram-
ing from “ethnonational separatism” to “counterterrorism” occurred domestically and was facilitat-
ed by the 9/11 attacks: the “counter-terrorist” discourse was already salient before the attacks.  
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 The same mechanisms were at play after the 9/11 attacks due to the continuation of the 
“counter-terrorist” discourse and facilitated the “counter-terrorist” framing for the Russian govern-
ment whereas the “framing effect” did not occur as the Russian public rather favored peaceful nego-
tiations. Consequently, it was not the focusing event of the 9/11 attacks that facilitated the accep-
tance of the “counter-terrorist” framing in the domestic arena as I argued. 
 This theoretical framework of relational mechanisms has high explanatory and predictive 
value and would be useful in further research in order to explain the creation and the trajectory of 
the political framing and its impact on social movements and stepped-up radicalization. However, 
taking into consideration that in three transcripts after 9/11 (a Joint press conference with Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and interviews with the Polish and French media) President Putin shifted the 
dominant framing, these framing theories omit to address why and how shifts in discourse occur 
when actors face different audiences or the actors change in international arena. 
 The limitations of my research are that due to limited time conducting the research and the 
limited amount of words, I had to select the most salient quotes from each transcript which might 
entail the risk of  not presenting other aspects of the framing. Another limitation of my research de-
sign is that I based my research only on the analytical model of Van Dijk (2006) and Levada opin-
ion polls which have their accompanied limitations discussed in the methodology section and on 
presidential discourse which might be more diplomatic in international affairs and not other politi-
cal elites’ discourse such as that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Defense. Final-
ly, I suggest further and more comprehensive empirical research by examining the framing of the 
conflict by all actors involved (the Russian state, the international community and the Chechen 
movement) and which one was the most salient to influence the domestic public opinion . 
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APPENDIX  The definitions of the 22 selected ideological strategies (Van Dijk,2004)
Actor description: The way actors or groups are described either in posi-
tive or negative way.
Authority: Mentioning authorities in order to advocate one’s 
claims. 
Categorization: Assigning people to different groups.
Comparison: Different from rhetorical similes, comparisons as in-
tended here typically occur in talk, 
namely when speakers compare in-groups and out-
groups. 
Consensus: Creating agreement and solidarity in situations where 
the country is threatened 
Counterfactuals: “What would happen, if…” the typical expression of a coun-
terfactual. An persuasive argumentative move that is also 
related to the move of asking for empathy.  
Disclaimers: Presenting briefly Our positive characteristics but then 
focus rather exclusively on 
Their negative attributes. 
Evidentiality: Presenting some hard facts, evidence or proof for one’s 
ideas. This may happen by 
references to authority figures or institutions (see Au-
thority above). 
Example/Illustration: A powerful move in argumentation is to give concrete 
examples in the form of 
short stories, illustrating or making more plausible the 
speaker’s argument. Short stories are better 
memorized, have more emotional impact and are more 
persuasive than arguments. 
Generalization: Generalizations and the formulation of prejudices about 
generalized negative characteristics of the Other. 
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Hyperbole: A semantic rhetorical device for the enhancement and 
exaggeration of the meaning. 
Implication: Deducting or referring to implicit information 
Irony: Accusations in forms of lighter irony. 
Lexicalization: An overall ideological strategy denoting Others through 
the semantic features of the 
words. 
Metaphor: A powerful semantic-rhetorical persuasive figure. Ab-
stract, complex, unfamiliar, new or 
emotional meanings may be made more familiar and 
more concrete. 
National Self Glorification: A nationalistic rhetoric. A device creating positive self 
representation by 
glorifying one’s country. 
Number Game: Using numbers and statistics in order to persuasively 
display objectivity and appear 
credible. 
Polarization (Us-Them 
categorization): 
Categorical division of people in in-group (Us) with 
good attributes and out-group (Them) with bad attribut-
es. 
Presupposition: The general sociocultural knowledge or ideas taken for 
granted strategically in a 
proposition when such truth is not established at all. 
Topos: Argumentation often based on various standards argu-
ments, or topoi, which represent premises that are taken 
for granted, as self-evident and as sufficient reasons to 
accept the conclusion. 
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Vagueness: Vague expressions, expressions that do not have well-
defined referents or which refer to fuzzy sets (e.g. 
‘few’, ‘very’, ‘high’, ‘low’) and create uncertainty and 
ambiguity. 
Victimization: Emphasizing the “bad” nature of Others and telling bad 
stories about Them who do 
not belong to Us. 
